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ABSTRACT
In 1909 Parker Smith showed that the ratio of seats won by the two major parties in
Britain was close to the cube of the ratio of their votes.  Taagepera and Shugart
argue, wrongly, that a fractal electoral map implies this.  In fact their premises
imply that the seats’ ratio will be the votes’ ratio to the power of 3 , not 3.
However, in the six countries we examine, the figure is between 2 and 3.  This
implies that the electoral map is nonfractal, political allegiances becoming less
‘clustered’ as you move from a macro to a micro scale.  Taking the U.K., we ask if
this is due to the geographical pattern of income distribution, and find that this is
even further away from fractality than is voting.  This fits the well-known
‘chameleon effect’ whereby poor (rich) people in rich (poor) constituencies vote as
if richer (poorer) than they really are.
Keywords: fractal, election, voting, cubic
3If the UK ever has a referendum on electoral reform, the cube rule is unlikely to be
on many posters or car bumpers.  Quite apart from being too arcane for any
politician to be able to mention it without journalistic ridicule, its main victim these
last hundred years has been the runner-up in each general election.  And the two
main parties of the day have been happy enough with a system which has merely
thrust them into a smaller minority when they have been in a minority anyway, in
exchange for untrammelled power when they top the poll, even when getting
considerably less than half the vote.  Meanwhile, the real victims of the first-past-
the-post system, the Liberals and most of the minor parties, would have given a lot
to have been on the wrong end of nothing worse than the cube rule.
It was, however, in the context of electoral reform that the cube rule emerged.  The
idea that, when the ratio of votes gained by the two main parties was a:b, they could
expect the ratio of seats to be roughly 33 :ba , was first put forward by James Parker
Smith in his evidence to the Royal Commission of Systems of Elections of 1909.
Forty years later Kendall and Stuart1  put a theoretical basis of sorts under it, by
showing that (a) if constituencies were normally distributed in terms of support for
each of the two main parties, there existed a standard deviation that would almost
precisely yield a cube rule (b) that the constituencies had had almost exactly this
critical deviation at the general elections of 1935, 1945 and 1950.  But what does
‘normally distributed’ mean here?  Kendall and Stuart invited their readers to
imagine the constituencies arranged along a horizontal line from safest
Conservative to safest Labour, and a cursor moving over them as national voting
4intentions changed.  The number of constituencies falling to the other side with
successive 1% swings in one direction would have a frequency distribution that was
normal.  However Kendall and Stuart gave no reason why the set of constituencies
should have a standard deviation that gave a virtual cube – as opposed to square,
quartic or anything else – rule.
Gudgin and Taylor 2  add an extra dimension.  They use a Markov system in which
your probability of voting for X is a function of whether your neighbour votes for
X.  The “cubeness” of the system will depend on (a) this probability (b) the size of
the constituencies.  After a detailed look at a constituency in Newcastle, Gudgin
and Taylor conclude that this seat possesses the characteristics which, if replicated
nationally, would yield something close to a cube rule.  Like Kendall and Stuart,
however, their concern is not to suggest reasons why a typical seat should be like
this.
But in the 1970s and 80s Taagepera tackled the question from a new angle and did
came up with a “first principles” explanation, albeit a highly tentative one, for the
cube rule.  In section 1 we outline this explanation, which relies on the electoral
map being fractal, and suggest that Taagepera’s premises in fact lead to a “square
root of three rule” rather than a cube rule.  Section 2 pitches this proposition at the
evidence, and section 3 interprets the results: so far as winners do better than they
would under a ‘square root of three’ rule, this suggests that electoral geography is
nonfractal, with political heterogeneity increasing as you move from a macro to a
5micro scale.  We also ask how far the geographical pattern of income distribution
might explain this.
1. Theory
Taagepera and Shugart’s Seats and Votes  (1989) 3  contains a proof of the cube rule
in 3 stages:
(1) If, for all pairs of parties, the ratio of seats won is to be a consistent function of
ratio of votes won, the ratio of seats must equal the ratio of votes to the power of n.
(2) Under a first-past-the-post system, with single-member constituencies, the
coefficient n will be equal to ln(V)/ln(S) where V and S are the total numbers of
votes and seats nationally.
(3) ln(V)/ln(S) will be very close to 3.
Let us take these stages one by one.
(1) Here Taagepera draws on a proof by Theil (1969) 4 .  Theil shows that for the ratio
of seats between all pairs of parties in a multi-party election to bear a consistent
relationship with the ratio of their respective votes, it must take the form expressed
above.  Let ( )jiji VVfSS =  for all i, j, where S is a party’s share of the seats and
6V its share of the votes.  Then, if we take three parties, A, B and C, we get:
( ) ( )ABBCAC SSSSSS .=
 and hence ( ) ( ) ( )ABBCAC VVfVVfVVf .= .
 This relation will hold when and only when ( )ji VVf  takes the form ( )nji VV .
 
(2) The logarithmic proposition is Taagepera’s own.  Clearly, Taagepera has to make a
specific assumption as to how ‘clustered’ party support is on the electoral map in
order to reach any such conclusion.  To take an extreme case, if there were no
clustering, in the sense of constituencies being identical, then an infinitesimal swing
in the national vote could lead to a 100% swing in seats.  At the other extreme, we
could imagine voters being completely clustered in the sense of voters behaving
identically in each constituency, but the constituencies themselves being
differentiated.  This would be equivalent to each constituency containing only one
voter, and first-past-the-post would produce proportional representation.
 
 So what degree of clustering would produce Taagepera’s logarithmic rule, and how
does he justify it?
 
 Taagepera looks for plausible regularities which might help us find a specific
functional form for n.  He says that ‘in the absence of any information to the
contrary, the degree of clustering of like-minded voters must be assumed to be the
same on all levels (that is, a magnified piece of a political adherence map would
look like the original map)’.  He is, thus, assuming that the electoral map is
7fractal5 .  We now show that such an assumption does not lead, as Taagepera
claims, to the rule n = lnV/lnS, but instead implies that SVn lnln= .
 
 How do we give content to the idea of a fractal political adherence map?  Suppose a
country consists of 100 constituencies, each consisting of 100 towns, each
consisting of 100 voters.  A fractal map would replicate frequency distributions at
each level of disaggregation.  Thus if, e.g. 40% of constituencies (currently) had a
Labour vote of more than 55%, so would 40% of towns in the median
constituency6 .
 
 Now let L be the percentage Labour vote, and let var(L1) and var(L2) be,
respectively, the variance of L between seats, and the variance of L between towns
in any one seat.  If the map is fractal, var(L1) will equal var(L2) and the variance of
the towns nationally will be 2var(L1) 
7 .
 
 But what about the variance of the voters in a given town (call this var(L3))?  Does
it make sense to think of individual voters as 40% or 80% Labour?  The answer is
that we don’t need to: all the fractal principle requires is that there be as many
knife-edge (right on the margin between Labour and Tory) voters in a knife-edge
town as there are knife-edge towns in a knife-edge constituency (and knife-edge
constituencies in the country).  Var(L3) must therefore be represented as equal to
var(L2) and var(L1).  The variance of voters’ ‘percentage attachment’ to Labour,
nationally, is thus 3var(L1) (see, again, footnote 7), though, to repeat, we’re only
8interested in what number and distribution, between seats, of marginal voters this
gives us.  We don’t have literally to describe anyone as 57.2% Conservative 8 .
 
 Suppose, then, that we scale the country up by a factor of y at each step, and carry
on doing this until we are at the scale of the individual voters.  If there are V voters,
we will have gone through logyV steps, and if var1 is the variance we get when we
disaggregate one stage, the variance of V will be var1(logyV).  (See, again, footnote
7.)  On the same reasoning, if there are S seats, the variance of S will be
var1(logyS).  Hence var(V)/var(s) =lnV/lnS.
 
 
 
 So take Fig.1.  The density function of the constituency percentage Labour votes is
normally distributed with a standard deviation sS.  We initially assume that its
9mean is 50% (the parties are level-pegging).  The density function of individual
voter political adherence is distributed normally with a standard deviation
SVSV lnlnss = .  Now assume an infinitesimal swing from Tory to Labour.
Labour will pick up the fraction OX of the total vote and O’X’ of the total seats
(fig.1).  Thus, if SA and VA are the shares of the vote and the seats held by Labour
(and using B for the corresponding Conservative shares), then 
AA dVdS  = OX’/OX
 But AA dVdS  = n (given that ( )nBABA VVSS = )9 ,
 and OX’/OX = sV/sS.
 Hence SVn SV lnln== ss , and not, as Taagepera claims, lnV/lnS.
 
(3) We now proceed to the final part of Taagepera's justification of the cube rule, his
proposition that, under certain reasonable assumptions, constituencies will be
chosen of a size that will make lnV/lnS approximately 3.
Assume the system is (consciously or otherwise) designed to minimise the
workload of an MP.  Assume this is done by minimising the number of channels
through which an MP has to communicate (i.e. each potential channel is equally
time-consuming).  Suppose there are V voters and S MP’s.  Then each MP has V/S
constituents & thus 2V/S channels (one channel each way with each constituent).
But the MP also has a channel to every other MP, and furthermore must monitor all
channels between other MP’s.  This gives him S(S-1)2/2 more channels @ S2/2.
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The objective, then is to choose S to minimise C = S2/2 + 2V/S.  Differentiating
gives dC/DS = S - 2V/S2 which is zero at 2V = S3 i.e. lnV/lnS = approx. 3.
This third proposition is hardly overwhelmingly persuasive, and Taagepera is fairly
tentative at advancing it himself as a theory.  However, as he rightly points out, it
fits a number of countries remarkably accurately in practice (more on this below.)
If, then, we accept it, and substitute the correct rule for n ( SV lnln ) for
Taagepera’s incorrect lnV/lnS, we have, not a cube rule, but a ‘square root of 3
rule.’  If the electoral map really is fractal, and we accept the final part of
Taagepera’s proof, a ratio a:b of votes will be amplified into a ratio 33 : ba  in
terms of seats.
We now look at some empirical evidence.  As we have said, if the political
adherence map is fractal, we would get the result n = SV lnln .  In the tables
below, we use actual values of V and S, i.e. the actual numbers of voters and MPs
in each country.  Because most of the countries we examine are close to the 2V =
S3 formula, a fractal electoral geography would imply something close to the 3
rule; or, to put it the other way round, the empirical existence of a 3  rule or
something close to it would imply a near-fractal electoral geography.
2. Evidence
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We first present actual data in terms of votes cast and available seats for 6 countries
where non-PR constituency systems have prevailed and the political system has
been dominated by two major parties.  The countries are Australia, Canada, France,
New Zealand, the UK and the US.  Using these data we impute a value for n that
would hold given fractality.  We then go on to estimate actual values of n and
compare the estimates with the imputed values.  The data constitutes votes attained
and seats won by the major parties of these countries in elections since 1955 and
was obtained from Keesing’s Contemporary Archives.
The data presented in table 1 refers to data for recent elections in each country.  The
imputed value of n is SV lnln , the value n would take, given the actual ratio of
seats to votes, if the political allegiance map were fractal.  Fractality plus
Taagepera’s model of paranoid MPs predicts a value of n close to Ö3 (1.732), and
the ratio of seats to votes is close in all 6 cases10  to Taagepera’s prediction.
Table 1 Voters, Constituencies and the computed value of the power
coefficient, n under fractality.
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Country (Election) # Voters (V) # Constituencies (S) "n"
Australia (1998) 11 11547325 148 1.804
Canada (1997) 13174698 301 1.695
France (1997) 28037180 577 1.642
New Zealand (1993)
12
2085704 120 1.743
UK (1997) 31288108 658 1.631
US (1996) 96400634 5113 2.168
We now focus on the issue of fractality itself.
Our econometric test of Taagepera's model is as follows.  If
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where aˆ  is an estimable measure of bias, and bˆ  is an estimable exponential
coefficient.  In the above model a = 0 and b  = n.  Equation (1) requires nothing
more than step one of Taagepera’s argument and does not require fractality.
Inference concerning fractality follows from our estimates of b .
Table 2. Econometric Output
13
Country Estimated Equation14 2R obs. DW
15
Fractal
n
k
Australia
(1955-1980) 16
(1983-1998) 17
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+-=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
B
A
B
A
V
V
S
S
ln
)178.0(
62.2
)023.0(
303.0ln
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
B
A
B
A
V
V
S
S
ln
)01.1(
64.2
)097.0(
068.0ln
0.96
0.49
11
7
2.05
1.03
1.80
1.80
0.78
0.78
Canada
(1957-1997)
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
B
A
B
A
V
V
S
S
ln
)152.0(
703.2
)051.0(
183.0ln 0.96 13
18 0.81 1.70 0.74
France
(1962-1997) 19
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
B
A
B
A
V
V
S
S
ln
)475.0(
732.2
)236.0(
388.0ln 0.80 9 2.40 1.64 0.72
New
Zealand20
(1960-1992)
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+-=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
B
A
B
A
V
V
S
S
ln
)302.0(
798.2
)041.0(
032.0ln 0.89 11 1.66 1.74 0.71
UK
(1955-1974(4))
(1979-1997)
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+-=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
B
A
B
A
V
V
S
S
ln
)28.0(
46.2
)024.0(
003.0ln
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
B
A
B
A
V
V
S
S
ln
)091.0(
088.2
)024.0(
19.0ln
0.93
0.99
7
5
1.47
2.73
1.63
1.63
0.76
0.84
US
(1960-1996)
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
+=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
B
A
B
A
V
V
S
S
ln
)47.2(
65.3
)64.0(
086.0ln 0.12 10 1.75 2.17 0.78
In table 2 we present econometric output of estimation of (1).  The output relates to
regressions ran upon the general election data for the two main parties of each of
the six countries in our sample over the period detailed.  Party A respectively refers
to the Australian Labour Party (ALP), the Canadian Conservative Party, the French
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right-wing ‘coalition’ of the day 21 , the New Zealand Labour Party, the UK Labour
Party and the US Democrat Party.  Party B respectively refers to the Australian
Liberal and National Party (ALNP), the Canadian Liberal Party, the French
Socialist Party, the New Zealand National Party, the UK Conservative Party and
the US Republican Party.  The sample sizes (obs in table 2) are quite small and
hence the results should be treated with some caution.  Elections only occur once
every few years, and are regularly subject to reform, which econometrically
translates as structural breaks (and found to be statistically significant in Australia
and the UK).  These two factors hamper the econometrics although in most cases a
reasonable degree of explanatory power as measured by the adjusted R2 was found.
In the case of Australia we found that the ALP was severely disadvantaged by the
electoral system prior to 1983.  In particular, the constant term implies that an ALP
vote was 85.4% as powerful as an ALNP vote at that time.  Bias in favour of one
party or another was also found in Canada (the Conservatives), France (the
Socialists) and the UK post 1979 (the Labour Party).  These advantages are
manifested from regionalism (as in the UK and France, where the favoured party’s
support has been less uniformly spread across the regions than its rival’s) or
strength in smaller rural constituencies (as in Australia and Canada).
We found in general that the ‘cube rule’ could more accurately be described as a
‘somewhere between a square and a cube rule’ in all cases expect the US.  The
econometric output of the US yielded much lower levels of significance, and
15
neither parameter was found to be significantly different from zero.  Examination
of the US data confirms the erratic relationship between votes cast and electoral
college votes gained.
3. Interpretation
With the exceptions of the US and Australia (1983-1998) all the cases in table 2
have a statistically significantly higher value of n than a fractal electoral map would
give (the values for n reported in table 1).  In other words, in each case sV/sS (and
hence actual n) exceeds SV lnln .  This implies that, as you take successively
smaller bits of the electoral map and blow them up to the size of the whole thing,
the degree of clustering diminishes.  Voters within a constituency are more diffuse
in their political orientations than are constituencies within the nation.
The statistic k, in the final column, is a measure of this effect.  k in each case is
imputed from n.  It represents the departure from fractality necessary to give n its
actual value in the country concerned.  So how are we quantifying departures from
fractality?  Suppose, again, that a country were divided into 100 constituencies,
each of which were divided into 100 towns.  k is then defined as the ratio of
constituencies’ standard deviation nation-wide to towns’ standard deviation within
a constituency; or, more generally, the ratio of the respective standard deviations
within two pieces of the electoral map that differ by a scale of 100 22 .  k=1 is the
fractal case.  k<1, which is our result in all the countries we have looked at, implies
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that the more you use the magnifying glass, the more heterogeneous the picture you
see.  The relationship between n and k is an inverse one 23 , and as k tends to
infinity n tends towards unity (proportional representation).  This is simply a
restatement of the proposition (see above, p. 6) that zero dispersion of voter
behaviour in each constituency (sV=0) is equivalent to each constituency
containing only one voter, which obviously implies PR.
In the case of the UK, n fell from 2.46 to 2.088 (and k rose from 0.76 to 0.84)
between the two sub-periods.  As long ago as Mr Heath’s win in 1970,
commentators were pointing out that the cube rule seemed to be turning into a
square rule.  The number of marginal seats was declining, so that a larger swing in
the total vote was needed to achieve any given net gain in seats by Labour or the
Conservatives (though Norris and Crewe find that the total gross change in seats
between all parties did not decline in relation to percentage swing). 24  Later this
began to be linked to a regional polarisation of political allegiances.  The high point
was reached in the general election of 1987, when Labour won only three seats
south of a line from the Wash to the Bristol Channel (London excepted) and the
Conservatives, despite an 12-point national lead in the vote, only won 10 out of a
possible 72 seats north of Hadrian's wall.  In 1992 and 1997 there was only a slight
reversal of this polarisation - masked, in 1997, by the spectacularly unequal overall
result.  As the political dispersion of constituencies moves upwards to rival the
political dispersion of voters within constituencies, Britain’s ‘over-fractal’ electoral
geography appears to be moving closer to ‘strict’ fractality. 25
17
We have therefore estimated n for different countries and thence inferred how, and
how far, their political adherence maps are non-fractal.  But what factors actually
determine how far away from fractality the political allegiance map is?  If we are
dealing with two parties whose support is closely related to voters’ incomes, then
the fractality or otherwise of income distribution is going to be a major determining
factor.
We have only looked at income distribution in the UK so far, but we found it to be
much more ‘super-fractal’ even than the distribution of political allegiance, the
standard deviation of (log) income in the average constituency being 3.87 times the
standard deviation of average constituency incomes around the national mean26 .
Hence, if people voted entirely according to their income (i.e. all those on £40,000
a year started voting Labour when Labour’s lead reached 10% etc.) first-past-the-
post would yield, not a cube rule, but something close to a quartic rule.
However, it is no surprise that election results in Britain are much closer to
proportionality than this.  One of the best-documented electoral facts is the
‘chameleon effect’ whereby voters partially assume the colouring of the area in
which they live.  People with £60,000 a year in Jarrow are more prone to vote
Labour than people with £60,000 a year in Reigate 27 .  We might thus credit our
man in Jarrow (Reigate) with a lower (higher) ‘effective income’ than his actual
one.  The result will be that Jarrow’s (Reigate’s) average effective income will be
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even lower (higher) than its average actual income.  To this extent sS is increased
by the chameleon effect, and n is reduced.
But now suppose we have a party whose support is in no way income based – its
support courses evenly downwards from millionaires through meths drinkers to
university lecturers.  There will, nonetheless, be some characteristic, or vector of
characteristics, of which the probability of an individual supporting that party will
be a monotonic function.  The problem is that, unless this vector is identifiable and
measurable in individual cases, we will be able to make no predictions as to
whether a cube rule, square rule or whatever is likely.  We will always be on the
firmest ground when weighing up the cube rule for predominantly income-based
parties.  And in many democracies, the two most unequivocally income-based
parties are the two largest parties.  This is probably the real reason why the ‘n rule’
has generally worked best, and has certainly received nearly all the attention, when
the context is the two main parties of state.
4. Conclusion
While we contest Taagepera and Shugart’s contention that their assumptions lead to
a justification of the cube rule, their ‘fractal’ yardstick against which to measure the
electoral system is an original and very fertile idea.   No one would expect the
electoral landscape to be neatly fractal or even neatly non-fractal.  But the way that
the ‘attrition-of-minorities’ effect is consistently stronger than it would be in a
19
fractal world is significant.  So are the facts that the UK, at least, is much closer to
fractality than it used to be, and has always been much closer to fractality than if
people had voted purely according to their incomes.  Overall it seems that political
diversity is greater within than between constituencies, but that this gap is narrowed
by the ‘chameleon effect’ whereby your neighbours affect your own vote and, even
after this effect is allowed for, shows signs of narrowing still further.
20
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1973), RPR and UDF (1978 onwards.)  Since none of these pairs has literally been a
coalition, but rather two distinct parties, which have fought against one another in general
elections, we might expect them to get fewer seats per vote than a single right-wing party
would.  However, our figures refer to the second ballot in each French election, in which
the two candidates with the most votes run off against each other.  It has been rare for
these two to be the two main parties of the right, and rarer still for one not to stand down
in favour of the other.  To all intents and purposes, therefore, their combined second-
24
ballot electoral performance has been equivalent to that of a single party, and they can be
treated as such for the present purpose.
 22 The choice of 100 is arbitrary, and a different base would give different values of k
for given values of n.
 23 The formula is 
S
V
k
k
n
100
100
log
log
1
1
-
-
= , given our choice of 100 as the scaling ratio.  Of
course, a non-fractal electoral map is never going to be as neatly non-fractal as this.  The
formula above, though, does provide us with a rough index of over- or under-fractality
when n, V and S are known.
24 P.Norris and I. Crewe, ‘Did the British marginals vanish? Proportionality and
exaggeration in the British electoral system revisited’, Electoral Studies,  13 (1994), 201-
221
 25 This is confirmed by looking at the UK’s Euro-elections of 1979, 1984, 1989 and
1994.  Whereas “fractal n” remains steady, varying only between 1.949 (in 1989) and
(1.933) in 1994, “actual n” is consistently above fractal n but on a downward, if irregular,
trend, 2.951 in 1979, 3.043 in 1984, 2.103 in 1989 and 2.668 in 1994.
26 Calculated from figures in HMSO, New Earnings Survey 1997  (London : HMSO,
1998).
25
 27 D.Butler and D.Stokes, Political Change in Britain, (London: Macmillan, 2nd edn.,
1974) chapter 6, provides a variety of evidence for this proposition, while William L.
Miller, Electoral Dynamics  (London: Macmillan, 1977) concludes that the social
composition of your constituency affects your vote more than your own class does.
